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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1843 
___________ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
v. 
 
RODNEY BURR, 
                                       Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-00913) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 30, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant, Rodney Burr, seeks review of the District Court’s orders 
remanding his Uniform Traffic Complaint and Summons to the Delaware Justice of the 
Peace Court for the State of Delaware, New Castle County, and denying his motion for 
reconsideration.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
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I 
 On September 11, 2011, Burr was issued a traffic citation by an officer from the 
New Castle County Police Department for failing to wear a seat belt in violation of 21 
Del. C. § 4802(a).  Burr sought to remove to federal court the Uniform Traffic Complaint 
and Summons issued with respect to the violation that was pending before a Delaware 
Justice of the Peace Court.  In support of removal, Burr argued, inter alia, that ongoing 
enforcement of Delaware’s seatbelt law interferes with his liberty interests in violation of 
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  After finding 
that removal was improper, the District Court summarily remanded Burr’s traffic ticket to 
the Delaware Justice of the Peace Court.  In light of Burr’s pro se status, the District 
Court granted Burr thirty days to clarify whether he also had intended to file a civil action 
challenging the constitutionality of the Delaware statute and, if so, to amend the 
“petition” that he filed in this action the day after he filed the notice of removal.  
 As permitted by the District Court, Burr filed an “Amendment to Petition” 
wherein he clarified that his original notice of removal was an attempt to both (a) initiate 
a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and (b) remove the traffic ticket to federal court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1443(1).  In that document, he also sought 
reconsideration of the remand order.  The District Court denied Burr’s motion for 
reconsideration with respect to the removal issue, but gave Burr twenty-one days to file 
an amended complaint regarding his allegations that the state statute violates his 
constitutional rights.  Burr subsequently filed a “Restated Complaint” in which he 
identified himself as a plaintiff and presented a constitutional challenge to the relevant 
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provision of Delaware’s Seat Belt Safety Act.  Shortly thereafter, Burr filed this appeal 
from the District Court’s order remanding the traffic ticket and the order denying the 
motion for reconsideration.   
II 
 Before we can reach the merits of this appeal, we must address our jurisdiction 
and the scope of the appeal.  We view the District Court’s decision to grant Burr leave to 
challenge the constitutionality of 21 Del. C. § 4802(a) following the remand of the 
Uniform Traffic Complaint and Summons as having permitted Burr to commence a civil 
action that is separate from the removed traffic proceeding.  The District Court has yet to 
enter a final order adjudicating the merits of the complaint that Burr filed on March 13, 
2012.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, only final decisions of the district courts may be 
appealed.  A decision is final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
for the court to do but execute the judgment.”  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 
(1945).  We thus would lack jurisdiction to review any order that pertains to the pending 
civil action.  As Burr has challenged the District Court’s orders only to the extent that 
they remanded the traffic proceeding and thereafter denied reconsideration of the remand 
order, the sole jurisdictional issue that we confront is whether we have authority to 
review those orders. 
 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), an order remanding a case to the state 
court from which it was removed is not reviewable, on appeal or otherwise, unless 
removal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443.  More specifically, except in a case removed 
under § 1443, § 1447(d) prohibits review of a remand order based on a District Court’s 
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determination that it lacks jurisdiction.  See Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 
F.3d 124, 126–28 (3d Cir. 1998); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 
742, 749–50 (3d Cir. 1995).  Despite Burr’s many arguments to the contrary, he fails to 
demonstrate that the District Court’s remand order was based on something other than the 
type of “routine” jurisdictional determination that Congress intends for district courts to 
make; as such, it is a determination that falls within the prohibition of appellate review 
under § 1447(d).  Accordingly, to the extent Burr challenges the District Court’s remand 
order with respect to any bases for removal other than § 1443, we will dismiss the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.  Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997).  Our 
jurisdiction is thus limited to the issue of whether the remand of Burr’s traffic citation 
was proper to the extent removal was sought under § 1443. 
III 
 To the extent Burr sought removal under § 1443, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order remanding the action to the Delaware Justice of the Peace Court for New 
Castle County.  We can find no error with the District Court’s determination that removal 
was inappropriate on the facts of this case.  Section 1443 authorizes the removal of a state 
law action when a person is being denied “equal” civil rights and cannot enforce those 
rights in the state courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).   This provision applies in rare cases.   
Davis, 107 F.3d at 1048–49.  To succeed at removal on this basis, a state court defendant 
must allege a deprivation of rights guaranteed by a federal law providing for specific civil 
rights stated in terms of racial equality.  Id. at 1047.  In addition, removal under § 1443 is 
only available where the defendant’s federal civil rights would inevitably be denied by 
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the very act of being brought to trial in state court.  Davis, 107 F.3d at 1050; see 
generally Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966). 
Burr has not shown that § 1443 applies to this action.  As the District Court 
correctly noted, Burr’s allegations do not involve racial discrimination or inequality of 
any kind.  Nor has Burr demonstrated that he will be unable to enforce his civil rights in 
state court.  Furthermore, no argument has been presented to demonstrate that the District 
Court abused its discretion in denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.  See 
Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s remand orders. 
